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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1938, Congress enacted the Foreign Agents Registration Act
(FARA). The Act required all persons employed by foreign princi-
pals for the purpose of disseminating propaganda in the United States
to register with the Secretary of State.' Concern within the country
had been mounting over the activities of foreign propagandists, partic-
ularly Nazi, fascist, and communist, and the Act sought to unmask
these agents and provide for official and public surveillance of their
activities.2
Some four years later, after the United States had entered World
War II, Congress amended and significantly extended the 1938 Act.3
1. Foreign Agents Registration Act, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938) (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1982)). Section 611 defines "foreign principal" as the government or
political party of a foreign country, a person domiciled abroad, or any foreign business,
partnership, association, corporation, or political organization.
2. The House of Representatives' report accompanying the original bill was on the
"Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda." H.R. REP. No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23
(1935). Some of the propaganda activities were disguised under otherwise legitimate business
activities. See, e.g., Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943) (registered author and
journalist disseminated German war propaganda in the United States). For the legislative
history and purpose of FARA, see Attorney General of the United States v. Irish People, Inc.,
684 F.2d 928, 937-43 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
3. Foreign Agents Registration Act, ch. 263, 56 Stat. 248 (1942) (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1982)). All functions of the Secretary of State under the Act were
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The amendment expressly declared the policy and purpose of the Act
to be the protection of "the national defense, internal security, and
foreign relations of the United States." It sought to force agents dis-
seminating foreign propaganda into the open, "so that the Govern-
ment and the people of the United States may be informed of the
identity of such persons and may appraise their statements and
actions in the light of their associations and activities."4
The revised Act contained an elaborate definition of the term
"political propaganda," which has since remained unchanged.' The
revised Act also empowered the Attorney General to label foreign
communicative materials, including films, as "political propaganda." 6
Once the Attorney General makes such a determination, the material
at issue must carry a label which identifies it as political propaganda.7
The Act further empowers the Attorney General to make "such rules,
regulations, and forms as he may deem necessary to carry out the
provisions of this [Act]." ' One such regulation requires the foreign
agent to disclose the names of any station, organization, or theater
showing films labeled as "political propaganda," the dates of their
transferred to the Attorney General. Exec. Order No. 9176, 7 Fed. Reg. 4127 (1942),
reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 601, at 158 (1982).
4. FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 611, at 161 (1982).
5. "Political propaganda" is:
[A]ny oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication or
expression by any person (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person
disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon,
indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any
section of the public within the United States with reference to the political or
public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a
foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United
States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or
(2) which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political,
or religious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or
violence in any other American republic or the overthrow of any government or
political subdivision of any other American republic by any means involving the
use of force or violence.
22 U.S.C. § 6110).
6. "The Attorney General, having due regard for the national security and the public
interest, may by regulation prescribe.., the manner and form in which such statement shall be
made and require the inclusion of ... information . . .identifying such agent .. .and such
political propaganda and its sources." Id. § 614(b).
7. In addition, the label must state that the person transmitting the political propaganda
is registered with the Department of Justice as an agent of a foreign principal, that the
registration statement is available for inspection along with copies of the propaganda at the
Department of Justice, and that registration of the agent does not indicate that the United
States government has approved the materials. Id.
8. Id. § 620.
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showing, and the estimated attendance.9
In the fall of 1982, the Justice Department selected five Canadian
films for review, and determined that three of them constituted polit-
ical propaganda.'" The first two films, Acid From Heaven and Acid
Rain: Requiem or Recovery, deal with the phenomenon of acid deposi-
tion, while the third, If You Love This Planet, deals with the medical
effects of nuclear war. I  The Justice Department informed the
National Film Board of Canada, the foreign agent that distributed the
films in the United States, that the films would have to carry labels
identifying them as "political propaganda."' 2 Two separate federal
lawsuits filed in March 1983, one in California and the other in the
District of Columbia, challenged the constitutionality of the labeling
and reporting requirements of FARA as applied to the three Cana-
dian films.
A. Keene v. Meese
Barry Keene, majority leader of the California state senate and
member of the California Bar, wished to exhibit the three films as a
means of communicating his own ideas on the subjects concerned. 13
Alleging that the "political propaganda" label deterred him from
showing the films and that the labeling constituted an abridgement of
his first amendment right to freedom of speech, Keene brought suit to
enjoin the Attorney General of the United States and the Chief of the
Registration Unit in the Internal Security Section of the Criminal
Division of the Justice Department from applying the label to the
films. To show the films while they carried such a label, he claimed,
would adversely affect his personal, political, and professional reputa-
tion, and would injure his legal practice and his ability to be
reelected. 'I
On September 7, 1983, the United States District Court for the
9. Brief for Appellants at 4, Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 84-5318),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
10. Id. at 7.
11. Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (E.D. Cal. 1983); Brief for Appellee at 5,
Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No. 85-1180). The term "acid deposition"
encompasses the various ways in which sulphur and nitrogen oxides in the atmosphere descend
to earth in the form of sulphur and nitrogen acids. These modes include rain, snow, sleet, and
even solid deposition.
12. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1516.
13. Id. at 1517.
14. Id. at 1515. Keene claimed injury from adverse publicity which would harm his
political career. A special survey, which a leading pollster designed and the Gallup
Organization administered, showed that the public had an "overwhelmingly negative" reaction
to a politician who showed foreign films that the Justice Department had classified as "political
propaganda." Brief for Appellee at 30, Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No. 85-1180).
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Eastern District of California granted Keene's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction,15 and on September 12, 1985, it granted summary
judgment on his request for a permanent injunction against the appli-
cation of FARA to the three films.' 6 Writing for the court, Judge
Ramirez rejected the government's argument that the Act's definition
of the term "political propaganda" was neutral and without any pejo-
rative or denigrating connotation, and accepted the unchallenged
expert testimony Keene presented to establish the meaning of the
term. m" As a factual matter, Judge Ramirez had little difficulty in
finding that the phrase "political propaganda," as officials of the Jus-
tice Department applied it, abridged speech.' 8
From FARA's legislative history, the trial court found that Con-
gress intended to denigrate the labeled materials by using the term
"political propaganda," and that this term was not only "semantically
slanted" but that it had already acquired its "unsavory connotation"
when Congress enacted FARA.' 9 Further, the court also concluded
that Congress had enacted the portions of the Act at issue "in order to
suppress or restrict that which it found abhorrent."2 According to
the California district court, Congress understood and intended the
label "political propaganda" as a term of opprobrium by which it
intended to discourage or suppress speech.2'
Stating that an abridgement within the meaning of the first
amendment occurs whenever there is a suppression of speech or a sub-
stantial interference therewith, the court held that the stigmatization
of the three films at issue rendered them unavailable to Keene as vehi-
cles for communicating his own views on the matter and thereby
abridged his first amendment right to freedom of speech.2 2 The dis-
trict court declared sections 611(j) and 614(a), (b) and (c) of FARA
unconstitutional and severable from the remainder of the Act, and
enjoined the Attorney General from imposing the requirements of
these sections on the three films.23 The government took the case on
Keene also claimed that as a lawyer he would risk violating professional codes of conduct if he
were to show films that were viewed as containing false or misleading claims. Id. at 25 n.27.
15. 569 F. Supp. at 1523.
16. Id. at 1523; Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (on motion to
alter judgment), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986).
17. Keene, 619 F. Supp. at 1124-25. For a description of the expert testimony, see infra
note 156.
18. Id. at 1124.
19. Id. at 1121, 1125.
20. Id. at 1124.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1123-24.
23. Id. at 1128.
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direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which noted
probable jurisdiction. 4
Surprisingly, the government has interpreted FARA and the rel-
evant Justice Department regulations as applying solely to the regis-
trant, the foreign agent.25 It therefore has no objection to Keene
removing the labels from the films before showing them.26 Thus,
Keene's objection is not that he must show the films with the labels in
place. His true objection is that the government's classification of the
films as "political propaganda" emanating from a foreign source is in
itself an abridgement of his first amendment rights, and that the label-
ing is a species of censorship.2" Thus, the major constitutional issue in
the case is whether the government, when it labels communicative
materials produced abroad as "political propaganda" under FARA,
abridges the first amendment right of freedom of speech of a person
who wishes to use the materials as expressions of his personal views.28
24. Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), which allows direct appeals from decisions invalidating acts of
Congress.
25. Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1516 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
26. Id. In addition, the label attached to the films did not include the phrase "political
propaganda" as such. Brief for Appellants at 4, Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No.
85-1180). The government's position is baffling because it defeats the purpose of informing the
public of the films' foreign origin. Brief for Appellee at 11 & n.6, Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct.
1632 (1986) (No. 85-1180). Through press releases and letters to newspapers, however, the
government "widely informed the public that the films had been officially designated as foreign
political propaganda." Brief for Appellants at 6, Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir.)
(No. 84-5318), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
27. Keene, 619 F. Supp. at 1118.
28. There is, of course, the question of the plaintiff's standing. Recent Court opinions on
the subject have required a plaintiff to allege "a present or immediate injury in fact" so as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues; a causal
connection between the asserted injury and the challenged action; and redressability, that is
that the injury is of a type "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" of the court. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2971 (1985). Further, for the purpose of ruling on a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the trial court must accept as true all material
allegations in the complaint. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). In Keene, the
government failed to counter, by affidavit or otherwise, Keene's declarations on standing.
Instead, the government argued that the plaintiff's declarations were insufficient to confer
standing. 619 F. Supp. at 1117.
While Keene claimed that the government's labeling was "a species of censorship," the
government chose instead to treat his claim as one of a "chilling effect," relying upon Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (Reluctance to engage in first amendment activities because of a fear
of future governmental sanction is insufficient to confer standing because there is no "injury in
fact."). The district court found that FARA's labeling of the films constituted a "present
governmental interference with or suppression of expression." 619 F. Supp. at 1118; 569 F.
Supp. at 1518. The trial court also found that Keene's injury stemmed directly from the
government's action under FARA because it was the Act's "opprobrious characterization of
plaintiff's chosen medium of expression" that placed the handicap upon him as a participant in
the "marketplace of ideas." Id. at 1518. Finally, the court rejected the government's
contention that the injunction Keene sought would not redress the injury because his
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. Block v. Meese
The second case that the labeling of the three films spawned was
initiated by several plaintiffs: Mr. Mitchell Block, president of a com-
pany that was the sole distributor in the United States of the film If
You Love This Planet, and several potential exhibitors of the films,
including the State of New York, the New York Library Association,
a cinema house, and two environmental organizations. The plaintiffs
claimed they had suffered actual economic injury in the form of lost
profits on the sale and distribution of the films, that they were likely
to suffer injury to their reputations because their names would be
reported to the Justice Department as users of foreign "political prop-
aganda," and that the Act burdened their first amendment right to
communicate with their constituencies and to disseminate their
ideas.29
In stark contrast with the Keene court, the trial court dismissed
the complaint for lack of standing-"failure to state a case or contro-
versy under the United States Constitution."3 It held that the plain-
tiffs had not alleged any "injury in fact" because the reporting of their
names to the Justice Department did not per se cause any injury, and
any stigma that attached was "highly speculative."3 The court also
found that the label "political propaganda" was neutral and did not
denigrate the material so labeled.32 Finally, the court found that to
establish causality it would have to assume that the public would
constituents and audiences may nonetheless react negatively to the films. Characterizing this
argument as "irrelevant and quite possibly disingenuous," the court distinguished between the
plaintiff's willingness to risk disapproval based on the merits of the films and that based on the
government's label of "political propaganda." Id. at 1518-19.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the government has adhered to its argument that
whatever "chilling effect" may arise from FARA, it is not sufficient to confer standing. Brief
for Appellants at 12-14, Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No. 85-1180). The
government has also argued on appeal that causality in the case is too "indirect and convoluted
... [a] chain of events" to meet the standing requirement because it requires that the public
find out about the government's labeling, that they attach a pejorative connotation to the term
"political propaganda" when that term does not appear on the label attached to the films, and
that they finally transfer the negative value judgment to the plaintiff. Id. at 15-16. It is
possible that the Court may find that Keene's alleged injuries are conjectural or that the
causality is too attenuated to support standing, and thereby avoid the constitutional issue. But
see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (holding allegations of
environmental and aesthetic consequences stemming from operation of a nuclear power plant
sufficient to confer standing).
29. Brief for Appellants at 22-30, Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 84-
5318), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
30. Block v. Smith, 583 F. Supp. 1288, 1298 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
31. Id. at 1295.
32. Id. at 1297-98.
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react negatively to the films despite the neutral definition of "political
propaganda" in FARA, that this negative reaction would lead the
audiences to discount the films' messages, and that the public would
lose respect for the plaintiffs because they showed films which the
government had labeled as "political propaganda."33 The court was
not willing to accept such a chain of assumptions.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed the trial court's decision on standing, but remanded
to the trial court to enter judgment for the government.34 Judge
Scalia (now an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court) wrote the
opinion for the three-judge panel which included Judges Bork and
Wright. In the circuit court's view, the factual allegations of eco-
nomic harm and injury to reputation from the reporting requirements
of FARA were sufficient to confer standing upon the plaintiffs.3 5 In
addition, the court found that the necessary causality was established,
rejecting the government's view that any causal connection between
the labeling under FARA and the alleged injury in fact was only due
to irrational interpretations of the label by the public for which the
government was not responsible. The public's irrational interpreta-
tion of the label was immaterial so long as that reaction produced the
injury in fact.36
Proceeding to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the court of
appeals found, first, that there was no outright prohibition on the
films under FARA.3 7 It next determined that the term "political
propaganda," as defined by the Act, was in accordance with the dic-
tionary meaning and did not, as the plaintiffs alleged, identify the
films as containing "mis-statements, half-truths and attempts to mis-
lead."3" Judge Scalia further argued that even if the label constituted
an expression of governmental disapproval, it was a valid foray by the
government into the marketplace of ideas and did not amount to an
infringement of the first amendment right to freedom of speech.39
Finally, the court held that any invasion of associational or privacy
rights that may have attended the reporting requirement was only
incidental and too insubstantial to rise to the level of a constitutional
infringement.40 The Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' petition for
33. Id. at 1295.
34. Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1318 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
35. Id. at 1307-09.
36. Id. at 1309.
37. Id. at 1310-11.
38. Id. at 1311-12.
39. Id. at 1312-15.
40. Id. at 1315-18.
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certiorari.4'
Judge Scalia's opinion in Block is thus in direct contradiction
with that of Judge Ramirez in Keene on the first amendment claims
arising from the application of FARA to the three Canadian films.
Barring a dismissal on standing, the Supreme Court-with Justice
Scalia as a member-will have to resolve these differing interpreta-
tions of the first amendment right to freedom of speech.
II. POLITICAL SPEECH: ITS PLACE AND MEANING
Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech ....
First Amendment to the
United States Constitution
The construction of those seemingly simple and obvious words
has been one of the most controversial areas of American constitu-
tional law. Scholars and legal philosophers are deeply divided as to
the proper interpretation of the first amendment, and over the years
the Supreme Court itself has failed to develop a comprehensive and
coherent first amendment theory.4 2 This may appear to be a remarka-
ble situation at first glance, because there appears to be widespread
agreement that the first amendment is among the most important and
central provisions of the Constitution.43 It must be recognized, how-
ever, that the first amendment's freedom of speech clause covers an
enormous and ever-expanding ground, that it covers a very high pro-
portion of the outward manifestations through which individuals seek
to promote their beliefs and interests in a society that is law-abiding,
and that a significant amount of speech is "political speech.""
41. 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
42. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 717 (1970).
43. For examples of the elevated language used to characterize the importance of the first
amendment, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576 (1978) (the Constitution's
"most majestic guarantee"); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 881 (1960)
(The first amendment "is truly the heart of the Bill of Rights."); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (The first amendment occupies "a
central place in our society."); Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1980) ("freedom of conscience and expression enjoys primacy in our scale
of rights").
44. For the purposes of this Note, the term "political speech" will be used to encompass
all of "those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.' " See Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255. The first amendment also
applies to other categories of speech, such as commercial speech, libel, obscenity, and
pornography, albeit applying different standards of protection to them. Because only
"political speech" is involved in the cases discussed here, no further reference will be made to
other categories of speech. In addition, speech or expression may be part of a broader course
of action. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (statute punishing
destruction of draft card upheld as justifiable and incidental limitation on the first
[Vol. 41:591
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Generally, the central role of the first amendment is assumed to
derive from at least four distinct interests: first, the role of freedom of
expression in promoting individual self-fulfillment; second, its part in
advancing knowledge and uncovering truth; third, its function in
enabling participation in social decision making by all members of the
society; and fourth, its role in providing a safety valve for dissent and
for organizing the necessary consensus in society.45 These interests
are interdependent; not independent and distinct. Thus, self-govern-
ment and political participation arguably contribute toward both self-
fulfillment and personal growth.46 Furthermore, the best, albeit
imperfect, way that has yet been devised for the protection of the
individual and his rights in large modern societies is that of govern-
mental accountability to the members of the society. And no better
method than a periodic referendum on the government has yet been
divined to exact that accountability.4 A free and fair vote is thus
essential to a society which aspires to protect the interests mentioned
above.
The ability of individuals to act intelligently, both in participat-
amendment); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (first amendment protects peaceful
picketing on matters of public concern); L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 598-600 ("[e]xpression and
conduct, message and medium, are . .. inextricably tied together in all communicative
behavior"). But see Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT.
L. REV. 519, 521, 539 (1979) (Freedom of expression is to be understood "primarily" in terms
of the interests it seeks to protect and only secondarily in terms of the actions whose protection
is necessary to safeguard those interests.).
45. T. EMERSON, supra note 42, at 6-7. This model has been called the "marketplace of
ideas" model. For a discussion of this and other models, see Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978). For a different view of the
interests that the right to freedom of speech protects, see Scanlon, supra note 44. Professor
Scanlon divided the area into three categories: participant interests (the interest of being able
to call something to the attention of a wide audience); audience interests (to have expression
available in case one wishes to be exposed to it); and bystander interests (the restriction of
expression insofar as it has an impact on those who are bystanders, that is, neither participants
nor audiences).
In Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, Judge Learned Hand enjoined the New York
postmaster from refusing to accept in the mails a magazine that ridiculed the draft law and the
United States effort in World War I. 244 F. 535 (S.D. N.Y. 1917). Holding that the
provisions of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, did not give authority to the postmaster to
refuse the mail in question, Judge Learned Hand argued that "the tolerance of all methods of
political agitation .. .is a safeguard of free government" in "normal times." Id. at 540.
46. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 578. Professor Emerson describes these values as "an
integrated set." Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV.
422, 423 (1980).
47. A cursory glance at the condition of humanity around the world will indicate a
correlation between the lack of meaningful accountability and governmental oppression. See,
e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT, 1985 (1986); DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1985 (1986); see also Cox, supra
note 43, at 3 ("Only by freedom of speech, of the press, and of association can people build and
assert political power, including the power to change the men who govern them.").
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ing in social decision making and in holding their government
accountable, is a function of their understanding of events and social
situations and processes. Openness in government and free public dis-
cussion of issues give vitality to the vote. Public dialogue is, therefore,
a fundamental premise of "political speech" as it is of free speech in
general.48 In the words of Justice Brennan, "speech concerning pub-
lic affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government."4 9
For all its attractive features, the above model does not avoid
conflicts between the government's role in society and its relationship
to individual interests and fulfillment. In our polity, such conflicts are
largely resolved by reference to the Bill of Rights, and to the first
amendment in particular when the individual interest at issue is free
speech. Keene illustrates the conflict between the individual's interest
in free speech and the government's role in society. On the one hand,
the films represent Keene's personal views on acid rain and nuclear
war, and ought to be protected by the right to freedom of speech.
Furthermore, they fall into the subset, "political speech," because
they concern "activities of thought and communication by which we
48. Broadly, freedom of speech has a special value only in the context of a dialogue. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 43, at 605; Scanlon, supra note 44, at 521. In Cohen v. California, Justice
Harlan, writing for the Court, expressed his understanding of the first amendment thus:
It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely
into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that
no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests.
403 U.S. 15, '24 (1971). In a similar vein, Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California,
stated:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not
fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To coura-
geous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reason-
ing applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and falla-
cies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). On the role of a free press in maintaining a free and open political
system, see Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 175 (1979) ("Broadly defined free-
dom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society.").
49. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); see also New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-20 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) ("[T]he press must be left
free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints"
because the free press serves an essential role in our democracy and "serves the governed, not
the governors.").
[Vol. 41:591
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'govern,' ,,.o and therefore also merit first amendment protection on
this additional ground. On the other hand, Congress designed FARA
to protect the defense, security and foreign relations interests of the
United States, interests which represent some of the most vital and
legitimate functions of government.5
The films at issue in Keene and Block clearly fall within the spe-
cially protected category of "political speech" because they deal with
acid deposition and the consequences of nuclear war, two contempo-
rary political issues of unparalleled importance. The issue of nuclear
war and its consequences for individuals and society is not only one of
survival in the long run, but is also a political issue of current and
ongoing concern because of its impact upon the economy, the danger
of accidents, and other serious problems. Acid rain also has long-
term survival aspects because of its impact upon ecosystems and bio-
support systems such as croplands, grasslands, and fisheries.52 More-
over, acid deposition is also of immediate concern because of the eco-
nomic impact it has on major industries.53 Without any doubt, these
issues are of great concern to the American people, and as there are
no panaceas in these areas they are most likely to continue to be so for
a long time. The United States government has adopted strong posi-
tions on both issues, domestically and internationally.54 Finally, the
government has labeled the films as political propaganda. Hence,
there is no doubt that the case falls within the "political speech"
rubric. An initial question to resolve, therefore, is what the first
amendment says about "political speech." Interpretations of the first
50. See supra note 44.
51. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
52. See generally L. BROWN, W. CHANDLER, C. FLAVIN, C. POLLOCK, S. POSTEL, L.
STARKE & E. WOLF, STATE OF THE WORLD 1985 (1985) (harmful effects of acid deposition on
forests, fisheries, croplands, and grasslands). . ,
53. The Canadian government has published the following information on. acid rain in
Canada: 1) more than four-fifths of Canadians live in areas of high acid deposition; 2) the
fishery, tourism and forestry resources at risk due to acid rain provide about eight percent of
Canada's gross national product; 3) about 90,000 jobs are at risk in eastern Canada; and 4)
about half of Canada's productive forests (which produced $14 billion worth of forest products
in 1982) are in areas receiving high levels of acid rain. D. LEWIS & W. DAVIS, JOINT REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL ENVOYS ON ACID RAIN 23 (1986). While the United States government has
maintained that much is yet unknown about acid rain, it has acknowledged that "[a]cid rain is
a serious environmental problem in both the United States and Canada," and that "[a]cid rain
is a serious transboundary problem" which is causing both a diplomatic and an environmental
problem. Id. at 6.
54. After some foot-dragging, the Reagan Administration agreed on March 17, 1985, that
acid rain was a serious concern affecting U.S.-Canadian relations. Id. at 1. The same day
President Reagan appointed Mr. Drew Lewis as the United States Special Envoy on Acid
Rain. Id. at 5. On March 19, 1986, President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney endorsed
the Lewis-Davis report. Reagan, With Canadian, Backs Two-Nation Report on Acid Rain,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
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amendment may be grouped into three schools of thought: the
"absolutist," the "communitarian," and the "balancing" schools.
A. The Absolutist School
Of all the writers on the first amendment, the absolutists give the
greatest protection to "political speech," regarding it as absolutely
protected from any governmental restriction. The absolutists inter-
pret the first amendment literally to mean that Congress shall make
no law abridging the right to freedom of speech.55 They differ among
themselves as to what constitutes "speech," with some-the "limited
absolutists"-restricting the term to "political speech" and others-
the "absolute absolutists" by analogy-expanding the term to all
"speech."56 Both groups are unanimous, however, in according abso-
lute protection to "political speech."
The absolutists base their position on the text of the first amend-
ment, its history, and on an uncompromising adherence to the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" model of free speech in society. They draw
attention to the unqualified language of the first amendment and
argue that the framers, being intelligent people, knew the meaning of
the words they used, and meant what they said." That such a limita-
55. Thus, absolutists lay great stress on the fact that the first amendment contains no
qualification whatsoever. See G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 35 (1971); W. DOUGLAS, A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 25 (1961); Black,
supra note 43, at 874. Although there are no absolutists on the Supreme Court at present, the
foremost absolutists on the Court were Justices Black and Douglas. For expositions of their
views, see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715, 720 (1971) (Black &
Douglas, JJ., concurring); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Black wrote, "I read 'no law ... abridging' to mean no law abridging."
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
56. The best known "limited" absolutist is Professor Alexander Meiklejohn. See A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Meiklejohn,
supra note 44.
57. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 716-17, 719 (Black, J., concurring);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. at 157-58 n.2 (Black, J., concurring); Black, supra note 43, at
874-75. Absolutists remind us that the framers of the Constitution set up a government of
limited and delegated powers, and that Alexander Hamilton best expressed the popular view at
the time: There was no need for a Bill of Rights in the Constitution because the people had
retained all their rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). See also 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
713-16 (1970) (1833) (Among responses given for the lack of a Bill of Rights was that a formal
Bill of Rights "was wholly unnecessary, and might even be dangerous."). James Madison
expressed similar views in Congress. I ANNALS OF CONG. 436-37 (J. Gales ed. 1834). The
views Mr. Benson expressed in reporting the proposed amendments to the House encapsulated
the notion prevailing at least among the proponents of the Bill of Rights. The first amendment
rights, he said, "belonged to the people; the [committee] conceived them to be inherent; and all
that they meant to provide against was their being infringed by the Government." Id. at 733.
At one point, Madison stated that the liberty of the press "was expressly declared to be beyond
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tion on government may appear to be rather inconvenient from some
points of view, or that the passions of the moment may lead the
majority and its legislative representatives to want to stifle certain
opinions or voices of dissent, is entirely beside the point for the abso-
lutists. 8 The Constitution is above such considerations and is not so
malleable.
Justice Black has pointed out that there are several amendments
that are both categorically phrased and categorically construed: The
seventh amendment categorically preserves the right of trial by jury
in certain cases; the sixth amendment mandates a speedy and public
trial in criminal cases; and the third amendment provides that no sol-
dier shall be quartered in any house in times of peace without the
consent of the owner.59 Clearly, if these provisions are not mere
admonitions to Congress but are prohibitions on the government,
then why should the first amendment, which is also categorically
worded, be construed differently? 6° At heart, the absolutist position
stems from a distrust of government and the view that fundamental
rights cannot be secured unless they are regarded as absolutes. To
accept anything less is to place these rights at the whim and caprice of
Congress and its ephemeral majorities, that is, on the slippery slopes
of progressive abrogation of the rights.6 In addition, the fact that the
Constitution is written, reigns supreme over the legislature, sets up a
separation of powers and internal checks and balances, and creates an
independent judiciary, all reflect the underlying purpose of establish-
ing a new kind of limited government.62 The ninth and tenth amend-
the reach" of the government. Id. at 738. The freedom of speech could have no inferior a
status.
These statements may be tempered by the observation of Professor Levy that the framers
of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were not particularly concerned with the protection
of those aspects of free speech which are of major concern today. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 221-38 (1963).
Doubts have also been cast upon the accuracy of the Annals of Congress, as well as exactly
when Madison actually jotted down his recollections of the framing of the Bill of Rights. But
see Brant, The Madison Heritage, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882 (1960) (authenticity of Annals of
Congress borne out by Madison's notes made during a brief illness soon after the first Congress
met).
58. G. ANASTAPLO, supra note 55, at 39.
59. Black, supra note 43, at 871-73. Professor Anastaplo points out that there are
categorical provisions within the body of the Constitution itself: "No Bill of Attainder or ex
post facto Law shall be passed" (art. I, § 9, cl. 3); "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles
exported from any State" (art. I, § 9, cl. 5); "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the
United States..." (art. I, § 9, cl. 8). G. ANASTAPLO, supra note 55, at 39-45.
60. Black, supra note 43, at 866, 876.
61. Id.; see also infra note 187.
62. Black, supra note 43, at 869-70. Justice Black has argued that to allow Congress the
authority to abridge free speech is to give it a far higher place than allotted to it by the
Constitution, effectively converting our polity from one of internal structural balance between
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ments reemphasize the idea of a limited government and stress that all
reserved powers remain with the states and the people.63
All absolutists protect "political speech" absolutely, on the
ground that self-government can tolerate nothing less. For example,
Professor Meiklejohn, a "limited" absolutist, concedes that the first
amendment does not protect "unregulated talkativeness. '6 4 What it
does protect is the right of each citizen to participate on a basis of
total equality with all others in discussing and deciding all issues of
public concern.65 In Professor Meiklejohn's theory, the right to vote
is absolute, and so are all the "forms of thought and expression"
through which the voter derives the knowledge upon which he bases
his role in the self-governance of his society.66 These protected areas
include education, the achievements of philosophy and the sciences,
all literature and the arts, and free public discussion of public issues
together with the dissemination of information and opinion bearing
on these issues.67
The absolutist position has drawn the fire of many critics who
find it inconceivable that the Constitution would lend absolute protec-
tion to the right to freedom of speech. Professor (now Judge) Bork
has posed the rhetorical question as to whether Congress is forbidden
from prohibiting an incitement to mutiny aboard a naval vessel
engaged in action against an enemy. 6 He has concluded that, if Con-
gress is so authorized, then the "absolutist" theory totally collapses
because Congress may make some laws abridging free speech.69
co-ordinate branches of government to one of legislative supremacy, a la the British model,
precisely the system the framers sought to avoid. Id. at 866-67, 878-79.
63. Id.
64. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 56, at 25.
65. Id.
66. Meiklejohn, supra note 44, at 256.
67. Id. at 256-57.
68. Bork, supra note 43, at 21.
69. Id. The absolutist response to this criticism is that the framers had precisely the
necessities of war and national peril in mind when they drafted the first amendment. Professor
Anastaplo points out that the framers were fully conscious of these necessities because they
expressly provided for such perils in appropriate places. The third amendment provides that
"No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." In addition, the
Constitution declares, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONsT.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Had the framers intended to limit freedom of speech during war or national
emergencies they would have said so, just as they did in the above provisions. That they did
not do so, Professor Anastaplo argued, only strengthens the claim for absolute protection of
the freedom of speech. G. ANASTAPLO, supra note 55, at 44-45. Justice Black has argued that
the framers knew that free speech could be dangerous, and consciously chose to protect it
absolutely because they also knew that it was the "deadliest enemy of tyranny." Black, supra
note 43, at 881.
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Absolutists have also been criticized for the distinction they have
sought to draw between "speech" and "conduct." In drawing a line
between what is protected absolutely and what is not-and draw a
line they must-absolutists have attempted to distinguish between
"speech" on the one hand and "conduct" on the other. 7' The diffi-
culty, of course, is that many forms of expression can be looked upon
as being "conduct" and not "speech" only by a strained and contrived
categorization. 71 As Justice Harlan so felicitously pointed out in
Cohen v. California,72 much linguistic expression conveys not only
ideas which may be expressible solely in speech, but "inexpressible
emotions" as well. He added that, because words are often chosen as
much for their emotive as for their cognitive force, both forms of
expression deserve first amendment protection.73 And, it is an inher-
ent deficiency of the absolutist position that it is unable to provide
constitutional protection for forms of expression that are not
"speech," even in the core area of "political speech." Thus, although
the absolutist position has several attractive features, it is not a theory
that can be applied consistently and fairly in complex fact situations
which involve "conduct" in addition to "speech."
Applying absolutist thought to the three films in Keene is not
difficult. The case involves only "political speech" and no conduct.
Keene simply wants to be able to use the three Canadian films to
express his own views on acid rain and nuclear war without having
the government label that expression as foreign "political propa-
ganda." There can be no doubt that the films constitute "political
speech."'74 All absolutists would therefore conclude that the films are
absolutely protected "speech." For absolutists the only question then
is whether the government's labeling of the films under FARA consti-
tutes any limitation whatsoever. If it does, then it constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgement of free speech.75
70. In his concurring opinion in Garrison v. Louisiana, Justice Douglas wrote that it was
time "to face the fact that the only line drawn by the Constitution is between 'speech' on the
one side and conduct or overt acts on the other." 379 U.S. 64, 220 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
71. Thus, in Cox v. Louisiana, Justice Black took the position that a demonstration to
protest segregation and the incarceration of other demonstrators was "conduct," and not
"speech" and therefore not protected by the first amendment. 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965).
72. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
73. Id. at 26. Justice Black joined Justice Blackmun's dissent, which found that Cohen's
antic (wearing a jacket with the words "Tuck The Draft" in a courthouse corridor) was
"mainly conduct and little speech." Id. at 27. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 599-600.
74. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 137-71 and accompanying text.
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B. The Communitarian School
The communitarian school is best described by looking at the
views of Judge Bork. The major concern of this school is with judicial
activism and the consequent construction of "new rights" by activist
judges who, communitarians say, act without "legitimacy." 76 "Legiti-
macy" derives from the people and the Constitution. According to
communitarians, our constitutional system is not a pure democracy
because, among other things, the courts do not function on a demo-
cratic (majoritarian) basis and there is judicial supremacy." This con-
tradiction between democratic principle and nondemocratic courts is
resolved by the Constitution, through which the people have con-
sented to limited government and to a designated role for the
Supreme Court.78 In the communitarian view, the only proper ambit
for the Supreme Court's operation-and, correspondingly, of lower
federal courts, too-is within this constitutionally designated area.
The Supreme Court acts with legitimacy only when it applies "neutral
principles," that is, when it bases its decisions on value choices
embodied in the Constitution.79
When the Court decides a case, especially one in which the
wishes of the majority as expressed through legislation clash with the
rights claimed by the minority, the legal principle on which it bases its
decision will not be truly "neutral" in the sense that it will make no
value choice. The principle will embody a choice of one value rather
than another.8" But so long as that value has been chosen by the
framers of the Constitution, the judicial decision is "legitimate."
"Value choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers, not to the
Court."'" The relevant moral value system is that of the framers (and
76. Bork, supra note 43, at 8.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id. It is important to underscore the point that when the Court acts without
legitimacy, it does not only act imprudently or erroneously; it acts unconstitutionally. See
generally Wilson, Justice Diffused A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism With the
Views of Five Conservative Academic Judges, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 913, 943-50 (1986). The
basic work on the concept of "neutral principles" is H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3 (1961).
80. Bork, supra note 43, at 2.
81. Id. at 4. If, therefore, the Court has a case in which a solution based on one value
choice favors the majority and another solution based on a different value choice favors the
minority, the Court can choose between these values only as the Constitution directs. The
Court's power and legitimacy extend only so far as it can demonstrate in reasoned opinions
that it has a valid theory, derived from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of majority
and minority freedom. Id. at 3. When the Court does not have such a theory, but rather
imposes its own value choices, it violates the basis of its power and acts illegitimately. The
Court then becomes a "perpetrator of limited coups d'etat." Id. at 6.
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the legislature, as will be seen), and not that of the Supreme Court.
Where the Constitution does not clearly specify the value choices
that a judge must make, he must "stick close to the text and the his-
tory, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights." 2 But,
of course, it may happen that none of this is possible. A fair-minded
judge who studies the text of the Constitution, its history and their
fair implications, may nonetheless be unable to discover the preferred
value choice in a given case. The communitarian solution in such
cases is to have the judge implement the "community judgment
embodied in the statute."83 In such cases, the judge has no role other
than to apply the statutes in a fair and impartial way regardless of the
pain caused by such a decision.84 In other words, where the Constitu-
tion and its history are silent, any choice the legislature makes as rep-
resentative of the majority of the community is fine and the Court
must accept it.8 5
In the area of the first amendment, Judge Bork's view is superfi-
cially similar to that of the "limited absolutists": Constitutional pro-
tection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political.
Professor Bork would have no judicial intervention to protect any
other form of expression. 6 He does not indicate, however, the consti-
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 10-11. As one commentator has pointed out, Professor Bork's theory "conflicts
with the historical practice of the Supreme Court." Wilson, supra note 79, at 945. Professor
Bork's response is Olympian: "It follows, of course, that broad areas of constitutional law
ought to be reformulated." Bork, supra note 43, at 11. It is a matter of some wonder that
Judge Bork appears to place so much emphasis upon the text of the Constitution and its
history, and is yet so disregardful of the available historical evidence, such as the several
passages in The Federalist Papers that decry blatant majoritarianism and the consequent
threat to the rights of minorities. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (arguing that the proposed federal union would end the then-prevailing
conditions in which "measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and
the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing
majority"); id. No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison) ("It is of great importance in a republic not only to
guard society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against
the injustice of the other part .... If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of
the minority will be insecure."); id. No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) ("This independence of the
judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the
effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in
the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions
of the minor party in the community."). For differences between Madison and Hamilton, see
Mason, The Federalist-A Split Personality, 57 AM. HIST. REV. 625, 634-39 (1952).
86. Bork, supra note 43, at 20. Within the area of "political speech" Professor Bork
departs from the "limited absolutists" because he would make criminal any speech that
advocates the forcible overthrow of the government or the violation of any law. Id.
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tutional provisions from which these value choices emerge. In fact,
Professor Bork states that the framers probably had no coherent the-
ory on freedom of speech and were probably only mildly interested in
the subject. s7 We are, therefore, "forced to construct our own theory
of the constitutional protection of speech.""8 But we are not entirely
free to construct any theory we please, for the Constitution creates a
representative democracy, which can be given meaning only if there is
freedom to discuss government and its policies. Judge Bork thus
appears to fall back upon the structure of the Constitution to support
his notion of the right to freedom of speech. Freedom for "political
speech" "could and should be inferred even if there were no first
amendment." 9 However, we are not told why no reliance is placed
upon the text of the first amendment itself!9°
Were Judge Bork to stop at this point, his views would be mildly
interesting but hardly exceptionable, except for his unorthodox
approach to constitutional interpretation. But he does not. For
Judge Bork, "political speech" is the "discovery and spread of polit-
ical truth," and "political truth" is "what the majority thinks it is at
any given moment." 9' It is entirely changeable from day to day and is
the temporary outcome of democratic (i.e., majoritarian) processes. 92
So, in Professor Bork's view, there really is no constitutionally
protected freedom of speech. The argument he makes by drawing
upon the constitutional structure of representative democracy is only
to assist him in concluding that freedom of speech is no more than
what the majority (i.e., the legislature) deems it to be. He has demate-
rialized the first amendment's clause that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech." A truly remarkable feat for
a jurist reputed to be a strict constitutionalist. At bottom, Professor
Bork's "communitarian" approach to the first amendment is nothing
less than an abrogation of the first amendment and an enthronement
87. Judge Bork relies on Professor Levy's analysis for this conclusion. See L. LEVY, supra
note 57.
88. Bork, supra note 43, at 22.
89. Id. at 23.
90. Professor Wilson, too, has remarked on Judge Bork's "surprisingly little use of history,
the text, or the framers' intentions" in interpreting the first amendment. Wilson, supra note
79, at 947.
91. Bork, supra note 43, at 26.
92. Id. at 30-31. To leave no doubt as to his meaning, Professor Bork emphasizes that the
views he espouses were epitomized in the opinions of Justice Sanford in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925), and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Bork, supra note 43. at
31-35. Justice Sanford's opinions in those cases essentially held that in freedom of speech cases
the Court had only the limited function of determining whether the legislature had defined a
category of forbidden speech which might be suppressed. The Court then merely had to apply
the statute as the legislature had adopted it.
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of unalloyed majoritarianism.93
The first amendment issues in Block v. Meese9 4 and Keene v.
Meese9" are the same. Thus, Judge (now Justice) Scalia's opinion in
Block, with Judge Bork on the court, is an excellent case study of the
communitarian approach to the novel question of whether govern-
mental labeling that denigrates communicative materials infringes
upon constitutionally protected speech. The Block court started with
the obvious: that the government did not expressly prohibit the
films.96 It further rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the "political prop-
aganda" label itself deters use of the films and therefore is an uncon-
stitutional infringement of free speech, because it found that the
statutory definition of the term "political propaganda" is neutral and
does not import the pejorative and denigrating connotations the plain-
tiffs alleged.97 Further, the government's application of the label to
the three films in question is only an "accurate and lawful identifica-
tion of an objective phenomenon that is suspect [and] does not consti-
tute the government's expression of its own official suspicion." 98 In
other words, the government's labeling of the Canadian films as
"political propaganda" is not regulation of the content of the films,
which the communitarians acknowledge may be unconstitutional in
certain circumstances; 99 it is only an objective and neutral statement
of the foreign origin of the films.
93. Professor Wilson comes to a similar conclusion at a more general level, finding that
"Bork's abstract theory of preference neutrality virtually eliminates individual rights."
Wilson, supra note 79, at 947.
94. 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
95. 619 F. Supp. I II (E.D. Cal. 1985), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986).
96. Block, 793 F.2d at 1310-11. Communitarians may strike down prior restraints in
certain cases where the government is unable to show some specific interest that the restraint
protects. In Lebron v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Judge Bork, joined
by Judge Scalia, struck down the transit authority's refusal to display a poster critical of
President Reagan. 749 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The authority's action was invalidated
because it was a "prior restraint" and was not justified under any of the exceptions that permit
the state to restrict political speech in a public forum. Judges Bork and Scalia disagreed,
however, in the case of Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (activist plaintiff must
show more than actual malice to prevail on a libel claim against political columnists). Judge
Bork departed from his previously enunciated doctrine of constitutional legitimacy and argued
that judges must discern how the framers' values apply to modern conditions. Id. at 995.
Judge Scalia could not accept such an evolutionary view and adhered to the pure
communitarian view that any evolution of constitutional doctrine was a legislative task and not
one for the judiciary. Id. at 1038 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). For an interesting analysis of
this debate between the two communitarian judges, see Wilson, Constraints of Power: The
Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1171, 1186-88 (1986).
97. Block, 793 F.2d at 1311.
98. Id. at 1312.
99. See supra note 96.
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Moreover, even if the plaintiffs' claim that the label denigrates
the films were accepted for purposes of argument, the Block court
held that it does not amount to an infringement of first amendment
rights. It based its decision on the following reasons: first, the govern-
ment cannot be excluded from the marketplace of ideas; second, the
government is not required to remain ideologically neutral in any
debate on political issues; and third, the government may actively
affirm national values.1l° Judge Scalia went even further and sug-
gested that "political speech" by the government is as protected under
the first amendment as is "political speech" by any individual.''
Thus, the communitarian approach finds that the labeling of the
Canadian films under FARA does not infringe the freedom of speech
of persons, such as Keene, who wish to show these films as expres-
sions of their own views on the matters concerned.
It should be emphasized, however, that far from treating the gov-
ernment on the same footing as any ordinary individual, the first
amendment expressly limits governmental action. Thus, Judge
Scalia's view that the government has the same right of unfettered
"political speech" that individuals have is not based upon the text of
the first amendment.' As with Professor Bork's theoretical elabora-
tion of the communitarian approach to the first amendment, so with
Judge Scalia's practical application of that approach, the text of the
provision does not always survive communitarian exegesis.
Judge Scalia's argument that the first amendment does not
require the government to remain "neutral" in any public debate also
merits examination.' °3 It bears emphasis that neither Block nor
100. 793 F.2d at 1313-14. See also infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
101. Judge Scalia wrote: "The short of the matter is that control of government expression
(which would always seem to fall in the category of political expression, the most protected
form of speech) is no more practicable, and no more appealing, than control of political
expression by anyone else." 793 F.2d at 1314.
102. Professor Wilson concludes from an analysis of Judge Scalia's opinion in Block v.
Meese that the opinion infers "goals beyond the Framers' intentions," an exercise that
conservative judges such as Judge Scalia have condemned as "illegitimate" judicial activity
when undertaken by liberal judges. Wilson, supra note 96, at 1194. As to Judge Scalia's
general approach, Professor Wilson comments: "When pressured, Scalia leaves text and
history behind, and engages in basic policy arguments about 'common sense,' 'remedy,' and
.proper functioning.' " Id. at 1193.
103. 793 F.2d at 1314. Judge Scalia cites Professor Tribe in support of his position.
However, there is a fallacy in this claim as Professor Tribe makes a different point than that for
which Judge Scalia claims support. Judge Scalia claims that government may attach
pejorative labels to other voices in a debate, while Professor Tribe only concedes that the
government may participate in any political debate by adding its voice to those in the debate.
L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 588, 590. Government may "add its own voice to the many that it
must tolerate, provided it does not drown out private communications." Id. at 590 (emphasis
added). To get from Professor Tribe's position to his own, Judge Scalia has to demonstrate not
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Keene have claimed that the government must stay out of the debate
on the issues the three films raised. There is no evidence in the record
that they have claimed that the government may not present its views
on acid rain or nuclear war to the public. The only question is
whether the government may denigrate, and thereby place a restraint
on, the views of others in a public debate on matters of public con-
cern. Thus, Judge Scalia misstates the issue in Block, and his conclu-
sion is therefore suspect.
Further, if the purpose of the first amendment is the "discovery
and spread of political truth," 10 4 then it is essential to allow the unim-
peded flow of ideas and to have a public dialogue on matters of public
concern without stacking the debate for or against particular views, at
least until the public has made up its mind on the issues in question.
The government may participate in the debate; it may add its voice to
those of the other participants in the debate; but it may neither drown
out the other voices in the debate, nor may it seek to lend legitimacy
to its own views by stigmatizing opposing views. For the government
to do so before public opinion on a given issue has gelled is to flout
that very democratic and majoritarian basis upon which com-
munitarians base their approach. By labeling other points of view as
"political propaganda," the government stacks the debate against
these views, and thereby restrains their full and unimpeded
expression. "'
It is axiomatic that the government's expression has a special
impact upon the polity and the public. °6 Therefore, when the gov-
ernment pejoratively labels a point of view, its expression can hardly
be said to have the same impact upon our system as expression by a
private person. The government knowingly resorts to the enormous
only that the government may add its voice to the debate, but that it may actually stack the
debate in its favor by attaching pejorative or denigrating labels to views different from its own.
Professor Tribe adds in the section following the one Judge Scalia relied on that "[i]f the first
amendment requires an extraordinary justification of government action which is aimed at
ideas or information that government does not like, the constitutional guarantee should not be
avoidable by government action which seeks to attain that unconstitutional objective under
some other guise." Id. at 591.
104. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
105. Interestingly, while Judge Scalia recognizes that his neutral meaning of the term
"political propaganda" would render that label also applicable to the government's
communications, he prefers not to so apply it. 793 F.2d at 1312 n.3. This reluctance suggests
that Judge Scalia himself is not entirely comfortable with his exegesis of the term "political
propaganda."
106. See T. EMERSON, supra note 42, at 699-700; M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS 201-02 (1983). Professor Emerson stated that government "poses greater and more
subtle threats to individual rights" and that it has become "an overpowering antagonist in any
clash between state and individual." T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 38 (1966).
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weight public opinion places upon its pronouncements to prevent a
fair consideration of the ideas and views these films express, and pari
passu those of Keene. By labeling the films as "political propaganda,"
the government interferes with the development of that "informed
and educated public opinion" which is essential for national and
social decision making."0 7
C. The Balancing Approach
In contrast with both of the above theories, which seek to give
complete, or "absolute," effect to the fundamental principles that the
respective proponents hold valuable, the balancing approach seeks to
accommodate the contending and conflicting interests in any given
situation. Thus, while conceding the primacy of the right to freedom
of speech, balancers argue that it "can never be absolute."' ° To
make the freedom of expression an absolute, is to subordinate to it all
other values in society, individual and collective. The balancers have
other values, such as the survival of the polity through times of crisis,
which are clearly superior to free speech and expression. In addition,
the balancers argue that the quintessential role of government, and
more particularly that of the Court, is to give as much satisfaction as
possible to the legitimate contending interests in any conflict. There-
fore, "[s]ome balancing is inescapable."'0 9
While the notion of balancing legitimate interests in conflict may
be acceptable to most persons, the major difficulty is that of striking
the appropriate balance." 0 Balancing is inherently an ad hoc process
that can enunciate only a few, broad standards. The particular bal-
ance struck in any given configuration of facts depends critically on
those facts and not on any automatically applicable doctrinal direc-
tive. Professor Emerson has concluded that in "nearly every case, the
[Supreme Court] Justices could have struck the balance in favor of
either side, and in most cases there was disagreement with the balance
that prevailed.""' He laments that the uninhibited use of the balanc-
ing test has led the Court to adopt positions that are in conflict with
traditional first amendment theory." 2
107. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940).
108. Cox, supra note 43, at 3. Besides, as Professor Tribe has pointed out, if the argument
for absolute protection of "political speech" is a strategic maneuver to give up protection for
all other areas in the hope that the valued core will become sacred, such a strategy is unlikely
to succeed. -[T]he claims for suppression will persist, and the defense will be no stronger for
having withdrawn to arbitrarily constricted territory." L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 579.
109. Cox, supra note 43, at 4.
110. Id.
111. Emerson, supra note 46, at 451.
112. Id.
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Precisely because of its ad hoc character, the balancing approach
gives little guidance for future conduct. It has neither produced a
comprehensive and coherent theory nor has it given clear standards
that may be easily understood and followed by the community." 3 In
addition, some critics of the balancing approach have warned that
constitutional rights are not really protected when they are left to the
uncertain, even capricious, balances that legislatures and courts may
strike.' '1
Despite the fact that balancers reject an absolute right to freedom
of speech, they give it a very high status among the protected
rights. 15 And like the absolutists, the balancers derive the impor-
tance of the first amendment from its function in preserving the spe-
cial self-governing characteristics of our polity." 6  Thus, the
protection of "political speech" is among the most important interests
the balancers seek to protect, although many balancers would proba-
bly extend the same level of protection to any expression that the gov-
ernment sought to regulate on the basis of its content.' The
Supreme Court has applied some version of the balancing approach in
all important first amendment cases, and further discussion of the bal-
ancing approach and its application to Meese v. Keene is therefore
combined with the following discussion of the practice of the Court.
III. THE LIMITS TO "POLITICAL SPEECH"
Although the Court has not developed a comprehensive theory
of the first amendment, or of freedom of speech, it has frequently rec-
ognized that a heightened respect is due "political speech." In Meese
v. Keene,"I8 the Court must decide whether the labeling of the three
films as "political propaganda," without more, rises to the level of an
unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech. The plaintiff's
claim is not that the "political propaganda" label produces a "chilling
113. In fact, the Court's balancing approach has led to the enunciation of a variety of
standards in different cases, which in turn has led to some confusion among scholars as to the
applicability of the various standards. Some scholars see the succeeding standards essentially
as coexisting simultaneously; others see recent standards as supplanting earlier ones. See, e.g.,
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 972-1001 (11th ed. 1985); L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at
580-736; Cox, supra note 43, at 5-12; Emerson, supra note 46, at 430-51.
114. See, e.g., Black, supra note 43, at 876-77.
115. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 576-79; Brennan, supra note 48, at 176-77.
116. See L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 579; Brennan, supra note 48, at 175; Cox, supra note
43, at 2-3; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1970) (constitutional right of free
expression designed to remove governmental restraints from public discussion and to produce
a more capable citizenry and a more perfect polity).
117. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 580-81; Brennan, supra note 48, at 176-77; Cox, supra note
43, at 5.
118. 619 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Cal. 1985), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986).
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effect" on his first amendment rights, but rather that the labeling itself
is a "species of censorship."" 9  This question is one of first
impression.
The Court has repeatedly stated that communicative, or "pure
speech," that is, speech unaccompanied by any conduct, has almost
absolute constitutional protection and the government must show a
very high level of governmental interest to sustain any limitation on
such speech. Similarly, while the Court has never declared that the
right to "political speech" is absolute and subject to no abridgement
under any circumstances, 2 ° it has often stated that this right is to be
accorded the highest degree of protection.' 2 1 In contrasting the right
to "political speech" with other forms of speech protected by the first
amendment, the Court has stated that "not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance," and that speech on "matters of public con-
cern" is at the "heart of the First Amendment's protection.' '1 22
A. The Court's Protection of "Political Speech"
The reasons for the Court's heightened protection for "political
speech" appear in several opinions. In Roth v. United States, 23 Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained that the protection
given to speech and the press was to assure the "unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."'' 24 Justice Brennan added that the
freedoms of speech and the press had contributed greatly to the devel-
opment and well-being of our society, and that these freedoms were
119. 619 F. Supp. at 1118. Other issues raised in the case, such as those of overbreadth and
vagueness, are not discussed here.
120. Thus, in Cohen v. California, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated that the
first amendment (as applied to the states through the fourteenth) "[has] never been thought to
give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to
use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses." 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1970); see also
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (first amendment was not intended to protect
every utterance).
121. In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, the Court reiterated a statement
previously made in other cases that "speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection." 105 S. Ct. 2939,
2946 (1985). Professor Blasi has suggested that in adjudicating first amendment disputes, the
overriding objective of courts should be to strengthen first amendment doctrine in a way that
will enable it to withstand the intolerance of the worst of times. Blasi, The Pathological
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985).
122. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2945; see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (Speech on matters of public concern is at the heart of the first
amendment's protection.).
123. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
124. Id. at 484.
[Vol. 41:591
POLITICAL PROPAGANDA
"indispensable" to its continued growth. 2 5 Debate on public issues
must, therefore, be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 126
Thus, the Court's theory of the right to freedom of "political
speech" is that this right is inextricably wound up with, and affords
vitality to, our political system of representative democracy. The
Court's theory is clearly within the mainstream of thought in the
country on the subject, as expressed by the absolutists and the balanc-
ers. 127 While the absolutists and the balancers disagree about the lim-
itations that may be placed upon the first amendment right to
freedom of speech, and in particular on "political speech," they agree
the right serves the political and personal goals of society and individ-
uals. The communitarians, on the other hand, appear to start from
similar assumptions about the political role of "political speech," but
reach a totally different end by upholding raw majoritarianism and
denying, effectively, any constitutional guarantee of the right to free-
dom of speech. 2  The Court's acceptance of the former, as opposed
to the latter, of these competing theories is a vital ingredient in ana-
lyzing first amendment cases, and is a key factor in the case at hand.
The Court has ensured that "political speech" receives the high-
est degree of protection by allowing abridgement of content only in
the most extreme cases. In City of Mobile v. Bolden,1 29 Justice Stew-
art stated the axiom that "a law that impinges upon a fundamental
right . . . secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitu-
tional."' 30 The government has the burden in such a case to show
that the restrictions it places on content are warranted.13 ' And, a reg-
125. Id. at 488.
126. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2943. In First National Bank, Justice Powell, writing
for the Court, declared that the government is prohibited from "limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw." 435 U.S. at 783; see also Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)
(society has a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information, and the state cannot
suppress information about drug prices). Unlike "political speech," commercial speech is not
at the heart of the first amendment right to freedom of speech. Thus, if the government may
not impede the free flow of commercial information, it may not, a fortiori, limit the stock of
information on political issues of public concern or impede the free flow of information on
these issues.
127. See supra notes 55-75, 108-17 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
129. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
130. Id. at 76. Justice Brennan expressed the same idea: "The door barring federal and
state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only
the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests." Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957).
131. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1975) ("substantial burden rests
upon the State when it would limit in any way First Amendment rights"); L. TRIBE, supra
note 43, at 580-82.
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ulation of content will be unconstitutional unless the government can
show a "compelling state interest."' 132
In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 133 Justice Powell,
joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, found that the credit
reports at issue there did not concern any public issue, at least in part
because they were issued solely in the individual interest of the
speaker and its specific business audience. The speech in Dun &
Bradstreet was "solely motivated by the desire for profit."' 34 Such
speech was "hardy" and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state
regulation.' 35 In stark contrast, Keene does not desire to show the
films in question for profit, but rather to express his personal views.
In addition, the films address matters of public concern.' 36 Such
speech, therefore, merits greater protection than speech solely moti-
vated by the profit motive.
In Whitney v. California,'37 Justice Brandeis declared that first
amendment rights could be subject to restrictions only if the restric-
tions were "required in order to protect the State from destruction or
from serious injury, political, economic or moral."' 38 Almost fifty
years later, Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Cohen v. Califor-
nia,'3 9 elaborated upon this view and ruled that situations in which
the state had a justifiable interest in regulating speech fell within one
or more of the following exceptions that the Court had previously
established: offensive conduct, intent to incite disobedience to laws
(the draft, in Cohen), obscenity, "fighting words," and intentional
provocation of others to hostile reaction. 40 The films in Keene do not
fall within any of these categories. The government does not claim
that these films endanger national security, or that they present a
"clear and present danger" to society, or that they constitute "fighting
132. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 582. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
A similar test applies to government efforts to restrict the content of a message. The standard
is lower if the government seeks instead, only to regulate the "time, place and manner" of the
exercise of free speech. In American Mini Theatres, Justice Powell reiterated that the first
amendment prohibited the government from restricting expression "because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 427 U.S. at 64.
133. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
134. Id. at 2947.
135. Id. Regulation was less likely to deter the profit motive than other motives.
136. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. The Court has said that speech is on a
matter of public concern if its "content, form, and context ... as revealed by the whole record"
shows it to be so. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149
(1983). See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-03 (1952) (first amendment
protects films).
137. 274 U.S. 357 (1926).
138. Id. at 373.
139. 403 U.S. 15 (1970).
140. Id. at 18-20, 24.
[Vol. 41:591
POLITICAL PROPAGANDA
words," or indeed that there is any compelling government interest in
placing any burden on the showing of the films.' 4' In fact, the gov-
ernment allows the films may be shown.'42
Thus, the films are clearly within the area of "political speech,"
and merit the special protection the Constitution gives to such speech.
The crucial question in this case then is whether the label "political
propaganda," as applied to the films, constitutes an abridgement of
this specially protected right to freedom of "political speech."
B. Is the Label "Political Propaganda" an Abridgement of Speech?
The government's basic argument is that the label "political
propaganda" does not impose any impediment to the "political
speech" claimed in this case, or, at least, that whatever impediment is
placed does not rise to a level which offends the first amendment. 43
On the other hand, Keene claims that the government's label consti-
tutes a species of censorship. 144 Previous cases that the Supreme
Court has decided concerned statutes that directly obstructed and
prohibited the expression at issue. 41 Here, the impediment is not a
direct restriction on free speech, but is a burden that is tantamount to
a direct restriction.
In the government's view, the Act defines the term "political
propaganda" in a content-neutral manner and its labeling of the films
constitutes neither approval nor disapproval of the films.' 46 The gov-
ernment claims that the labeling "simply reflects the congressional
judgment that, in view of the wide range of motives that may inspire
.. . [the foreign] material, it is best viewed and evaluated with an
awareness as to its source."' 147 It is clear, however, that there are
ways to identify the foreign source of communicative material other
than labeling them as "political propaganda." Quite simply, they
could be labeled, "Made in -. " Of course, if the Court adopts the
government's view that the label "political propaganda" is itself con-
141. See generally Brief for Appellants, Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No. 85-
1180).
142. Id. at 36-37.
143. Id. at 18-37.
144. Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (on motion to alter
judgment), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986).
145. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1975) (regulation
distinguishing between cinemas that showed explicit "adult" films and those that did not);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970) (state statute imposing criminal penalties on offensive
expression that has a tendency to provoke others to violence); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957) (statute making it a crime to use the mails to distribute obscene materials).
146. Brief for Appellants at 20, Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No. 85-1180).
147. Id. at 19.
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tent-neutral, then that label would do just as well as any other. The
question, therefore, turns on whether the term "political propaganda"
is content-neutral.
The government claims that the statutory definition of the term
"political propaganda" is neutral and nonjudgmental and therefore,
its application to the films cannot impede the free flow of political
debate. 148 It also argues that the label has been applied to material
disseminated "by close friends and allies" and even to materials that
reflect policy positions that the government has adopted, thereby indi-
cating that no denigration of the labeled material is intended.' 49 The
government further argues that the pejorative connotations attached
to the label "political propaganda" are the subjective misunderstand-
ings of third parties (the public at large) for which it is in no way
responsible. 5 ° Finally, the government contends that the Act is a
reasonable exercise of Congress's legislative power, and that even if
the label "political propaganda" places a burden on the first amend-
ment right to free speech it is slight and not unconstitutional.' 5 '
In Block v. Meese, 5 ' Judge Scalia accepted these arguments. 153
The court embraced the government's argument that the statute's def-
inition of the term "propaganda" was in accordance with the diction-
ary meaning, and that no element of the definition supported the
plaintiffs' claim that "propaganda" means untruth.5 4 The District
Court for the Eastern District of California thought otherwise, and
held that the term "political propaganda" denigrated the content of
the films because the term was generally taken to apply to communi-
cation that contains "half-truths, distortions and omissions."' 55
The real issue is the factual one of how the average person on the
street will understand the term "political propaganda"; will Keene's
audience take the term "political propaganda" in the neutral statutory
sense? The inhibition to free speech occurs, if it does, because the
average person considers the government's labeling to be predisposing
in the matter. That is, free speech is burdened when the label stigma-
tizes the content of the films and thereby impedes free debate on the
public issues concerned. Well-known experts submitted affidavits that
support Keene's view that ordinary persons understand the term
148. Id. at 20-31.
149. Id. at 27-28.
150. Id. at 31-33.
151. Id. at 34-38.
152. 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
153. Id. at 1311.
154. Id.
155. Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1520 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
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"political propaganda" to have a pejorative, denigrating connota-
tion.' 56 The government submitted no affidavits of its own and chose
instead to rely upon the statutory-and-dictionary-meaning argument
stated above.
The government's argument on this point, and Judge Scalia's,
must, however, be wrong because the chief purpose of FARA is to
inform the public about the foreign origin of the films at issue.157 The
public's understanding of the term "political propaganda" is, there-
fore, not only an important matter, it is at the heart of the issue. If
the public's understanding of the term is significantly different from
that of the government, as the government argues, then the use of the
term misleads the public and fails to achieve the goals of FARA. It
makes no sense in such a case to argue that the public's understanding
of the term is not important, and that if the statute's definition is neu-
tral that's all there is to it.158
Similarly, the government's argument that it uses the FARA
label in a content-neutral manner, applying it to friend and foe alike
and even to views that reflect its own policies founders upon the same
rock of public perception. Indeed, if the public views the label as
156. Professor Leonard Doob, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Yale
University, stated that the government's designation of the films as "political propaganda" was
pejorative and denigrating to the material, and that it stigmatized the person disseminating the
films. He added that the attaching of the label suggested the communication was deceitful,
that unfair or insidious methods were being employed, and that some manipulation of the
audience was involved. Mr. Edwin Newman, head of the Usage Panel of the American
Heritage Dictionary, declared that calling something propaganda was tantamount to saying it
was not worth considering, and that the general understanding was that the communication
was put forward in an attempt to mislead. Brief for Appellants at 12-13, Block v. Meese, 793
F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 84-5318); see also Brief for Appellee at 23 n.24, 24 n.26,
Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No. 85-1180).
157. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Section 614(b) of FARA permits the
government to label foreign materials as "political propaganda" to protect the national
security and public interest. 22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (1982). This power is reviewable by the
courts, unless there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department" of the government, or if there is a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962). The government has not shown that any national security matter or public
interest meriting protection is at stake here.
158. Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d at 1311-13; Brief for Appellants at 20-31, Meese v. Keene,
106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No. 85-1180). In discussing the standing issue, however, Judge Scalia
dismissed as "irrelevant" the government's argument that any injury Sen. Keene suffered was
due to the public's mistaken interpretation of the label. 793 F.2d at 1309. Judge Ramirez of
the Eastern District of California had the better approach as he not only looked at the formal
elements in interpreting the term "political propaganda," but he also examined the ordinary
usage of the term. Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1121-22 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (on motion to
alter judgment), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986). In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
Justice Brennan examined the practical effects of the state law at issue and refused to base the
judgment on the formalities of the statute. 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1962).
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being pejorative and the government applies it to views of friendly
states, even some that reflect its own policies, then the government
misleads the public and the public's confusion on such issues must be
total! Moreover, while the peculiar and non-popular use that the gov-.
ernment makes of the term "political propaganda" has some bearing
upon the constitutional question of whether the term abridges a first
amendment right, it is not the sole consideration. More important is
the question whether the label offends the first amendment despite the
government's present neutral use of it.
Finally, the government argues that even if the label "political
propaganda" denigrates the materials at issue, the act is nonetheless
valid as a reasonable exercise of Congress's legislative power.'59 The
Supreme Court's approach on such issues has been that the interests
in question must be balanced: the abridgement of free speech must be
balanced against the governmental interests at stake. Here, because
the governmental interest is that of exposing the foreign source of
communicative materials, it can easily achieve this goal by using
means that do not have as great an impact on free speech as those in
fact adopted. And, where the government's goals may be achieved
through a lesser impact upon constitutional rights it cannot resort to
means that have a greater impact on those rights. 160
Numerous opinions of the Court have emphasized that protected
"political speech" is vital to self-government, and must be available
without any governmental hindrance. There should be "no potential
interference" with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-gov-
ernment, and there should be no threat that causes "self-censor-
ship.' 16 1 Such speech not only encapsulates the rights of the speaker,
but also those of the listener. 162 In Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres,163 Justice Powell wrote that the first amendment requires that
there be "full opportunity for expression in all of its varied forms to
convey a desired message"; 64 that "there be a free flow from creator
to audience of whatever message a film or book might convey"; 165 and
that the central concern of the first amendment was "the need to
159. Brief for Appellants at 34, Meese v. Keene, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No. 85-1180).
160. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. The present Court has no absolutists,
one "communitarian" (Justice Scalia) and eight balancers. The Court is therefore most likely
to adopt a "balancing" approach in Meese v. Keene.
161. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946 (1986).
162. There must be a "full opportunity for everyone to receive the message." Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1975).
163. 427 U.S. 50 (1975).
164. Id. at 76.
165. Id. at 77.
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maintain free access of the public to the expression." '166 Thus, if the
application of the label "political propaganda" impedes the free flow
of the dialogue on the matters of public concern raised by the films in
Keene, then that label must be unconstitutional.
The Court has struck down laws that required a license to be
purchased prior to the exercise of first amendment rights, and has
declared such laws to be an unconstitutional abridgement of these
rights. t6 7 In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,6 ' the Court held that "[t]he
power to tax.., is the power to control or suppress" the enjoyment of
the first amendment right. 6 9 In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 171 Chief Jus-
tice Hughes argued that such laws would "restore ... censorship."' 7'
Keene does not involve any tax on the exercise of the freedom of
speech; but, like Lovell and Murdock, it impedes the uninhibited flow
of ideas and obstructs a free debate within society by prejudicing the
audience against the films. In Lovell and Murdock, the Court did not
consider whether the tax was low and whether the affected persons
could afford the license fees. The impediment itself, without more,
was unconstitutional. Similarly, in Keene the impediment itself is
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has also struck down statutes which have
placed impediments other than a tax upon free speech. In Lamont v.
Postmaster General of the United States,172 the Court held it unconsti-
tutional to require persons who received mail from communist coun-
tries to return a reply card to the postal service in order to have such
mail delivered. 17  The federal statute permitting interference with the
mail in the above fashion was held to be an unconstitutional abridge-
ment of the addressee's first amendment rights because it required the
addressee to undertake an affirmative obligation which would almost
certainly have "a deterrent effect, especially as respects those who
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding city ordinance,
requiring Jehovah's Witnesses distributing literature and soliciting donations door-to-door to
have a license, to be unconstitutional under the first amendment); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938) (city ordinance requiring license to distribute literature declared
unconstitutional on its face). In other cases, the Court has held taxes placed on newspapers to
be a violation of the first amendment right to freedom of the press. See Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
168. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
169. Id. at 112.
170. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
171. Id. at 452.
172. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
173. Id. at 305.
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have sensitive positions."' 7 4 The Court stated that public officials, for
example, might be deterred from receiving the withheld mail because
the government had labeled it as "communist political propaganda,"
which, by implication contained "the seeds of treason."' 75 Others,
not in such sensitive positions, would be likely to feel some inhibition
in sending for literature which federal officials had condemned as
"communist political propaganda."' 76 The government had argued
that the statute only involved "inconvenience and not an abridge-
ment."' 77 But, "inhibition as well as prohibition" is a power denied to
the government.17 8 These considerations are perfectly apposite to the
films in Keene. The "political propaganda" label of FARA does not
prohibit the showing or the viewing of the films. But like the statute
in Lamont, the government's label inhibits and deters both speakers
and listeners from disseminating and receiving the messages of the
films.' 79 The "inconvenience" in Lamont of requesting information
the government has denigrated was no greater than that entailed in
Keene, and the latter is, therefore, as offensive to the first amendment
as the former.
Finally, in Thomas v. Collins'80 the Court refused to countenance
the minimal inhibition of first amendment rights that the requirement
of obtaining a state union organizer's card prior to addressing a union
rally imposed. Although the Texas law in Collins provided for the
automatic granting of the card upon application, (the state had con-
tended that the law was not inconsistent with the first amendment
because it conferred only "ministerial, not discretionary" authority),
Justice Rutledge's opinion for the Court held the law to be unconsti-
tutional. The mere requirement of prior registration for making a
public speech was incompatible with the first amendment. 18 1 So long
as there was no imminent danger to the public interest, the exercise of
free speech is immune to any restriction whatsoever, because "it is
from petty tyrannies that large ones take root and grow. "182 If in
174. Id. at 307.
175. Id.
176. Id. Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court found the Act to be "at war with the
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate and discussion ...contemplated by the First
Amendment." Id. at 307.
177. Id. at 309.
178. Id.
179. See supra note 14.
180. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
181. Id. at 540.
182. Id. at 543. In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Court struck down a Rhode Island
law under which a state commission urged a distributor of books to remove certain books from
sale. 372 U.S. 58, 64-68 (1963). Although the commission claimed that it had only exhortory
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Collins it was unconstitutional to require a card, which the state
would automatically issue, because it would inhibit the free exchange
the first amendment envisioned, then it must be unconstitutional in
Keene to label the films in question as "political propaganda." The
inhibition on freedom of speech is at least as great in Keene as in
Collins.
IV. CONCLUSION
A review of the first amendment theories and of leading cases
leaves no doubt that "political speech"-activities of thought and
communication by which we govern-is given the greatest degree of
protection, both by theorists and by the Supreme Court, and that the
government must demonstrate a very high degree of state interest
before it may be permitted to abridge such speech. In the case of
Meese v. Keene, the government has made no such demonstration.
The films dealing with acid rain and the medical effects of nuclear war
hardly amount to any threat to the state, let alone a serious threat.
The government has not even challenged the veracity or the objectiv-
ity of the films.' 83 Incredible as it may sound, the government has
even recommended that the term "political propaganda" be dropped
from FARA and replaced with a more "neutral term," such as "polit-
ical 'advocacy' or 'information.' "84
It should be added that the government's and FARA's stated
interests in identifying the films as being of foreign origin can easily be
achieved by the simple label, "Made in Canada." '85 Why then the
powers and no specific enforcement powers, the Court found that the scheme amounted to
"governmental censorship."
183. In Block, several scientists submitted affidavits stating that the films on acid rain were
factual and fair. Brief for Appellants at 14, Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986). The government did not controvert these submissions. Id. at
14 n.8.
184. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Edward Schmults to Rep. Robert Kastenmeier,
quoted in Brief for Appellants at 14-15, Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 84-
5318), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
185. It is worth noting that about the same time that the government was seeking to attach
the label of "political propaganda" to the three Canadian films at issue here, thereby impeding
the free flow of information domestically, it was seeking to defend the "right" to the free flow
of information internationally. On June 2, 1981, Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams
denounced the "massive assault on the free flow of information" attempted in UNESCO.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS 306
(1984). Undersecretary of State James Buckley affirmed the government's commitment to the
free flow of information and news. Id. at 405. Even President Reagan participated in this
effort to stave off international attempts to impede the free flow of information. In writing to
House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Mr. Reagan characterized the principle of the free flow of
information as the cornerstone of democratic order. He cited article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
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fuss? On Sen. Keene's side it is clear that he would face much opposi-
tion to his views, as expressed in the films, were they to be labeled as
"political propaganda."'8 6  The government's label would thus
impede his free expression of views on matters of public concern.
The government's interests are not as clear, but probably are a
combination of the following. First, the executive branch's general
interest in exercising powers granted to it by Congress without any
review by the courts. Second, its particular interest in denigrating the
specific views the films expressed, for an unusual degree of skepticism,
if not hostility, toward environmental concerns and fears of nuclear
holocaust characterized the Reagan Administration's early years.
Third, its general interest in preserving the power of denigration for
future occasions. Finally, its interest in preserving its right under
FARA to structure the national debate on the issues covered by the
films and all other foreign policy questions by ostracizing, through
pejorative labeling, opposing points of view.' s7
In any case, the government has argued that the "political propa-
ganda" label is innocuous and only follows the neutral definition of
and expression, and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of national frontiers. Mr. Reagan lamented that these principles were so often
observed only in the breach nowadays. Id. at 410. On March 4, 1982, Undersecretary of State
Buckley declared that the government had been fighting the "good fight" against the efforts to
establish the New World Information Order, and that they had "stoutly" defended such
fundamental principles of a free press as the right to a "work environment free of
governmental interference." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
CURRENT DOCUMENTS 416 (1985). The Senate, too, could not sit by while other countries
launched assaults on free speech and free press. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. S12,733 (1981)
(statement of Sen. Dan Quayle); id. at S12,735 (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan).
The Senate approved by a vote of 99 to 0 a resolution opposing efforts within UNESCO to
regulate the press and free flow of information. S. Res. 1636, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG.
REC. 12,733, 12,737 (1981). Subsequently, the United States withdrew from UNESCO,
among other reasons, because of the efforts to impede the free flow of information. Letter from
Secretary of State Schultz to the Director-General of UNESCO (December 28, 1983),
reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT
DOCUMENTS 282-83 (1985); see also, Dept. of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1982 and
1983, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 693, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 697 (1982).
186. See supra note 14.
187. The government has also attempted to constrain and structure national debates on
political issues by denying entry visas to foreign visitors whose views and opinions the
government disfavors. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 56, at xiii-xiv (denial of entry visas to
foreigners whose views are deemed "subversive"). For recent efforts of this kind, see Shipler,
Seeing Visa Denials as Attempt to Manipulate Debate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1986, at 10, col. 3
(nat'l ed.); Writers Protest U.S. Order to Deport Author Over Political Works, N.Y. Times, Nov.
16, 1986, at 15, col. 3 (nat'l ed.). For a case striking down the United States Information
Agency's regulations setting out when films may be deemed "educational," and therefore
exempt from customs duties and licensing requirements, see Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646
F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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the term included within the statute. The true impact of the label on
the plaintiff's first amendment right, however, must be assessed by its
practical impact and not by the formalistic test the government pro-
poses. The first amendment's role in the governance of our society, as
acknowledged by theory and case law alike, cannot be undermined by
formalistic interpretations that leave its shell, but gut its substance.
In situations analogous to the instant case, the Court has struck down
other impediments to the exercise of the freedom of speech. And,
while the case of Meese v. Keene involves a different factual base from
the previous cases in that there is governmental denigration of the
communicative material concerned rather than a licensing or other
requirement, the Court's first amendment doctrine and case law leave
it no choice but to strike down the impediment to the freedom of
speech in this case because the government has shown no state inter-
est whatsoever in the imposition of the impediment.
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* This casenote is for my wife, Margarita. I also wish to thank Mr. Kevin Dorse and
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